This strongly depends on what you mean by "theory of knowledge".

If you mean the practical importance of self-honesty, and a historical awareness of how easily we slip into self-delusion, then I agree. See, for instance, https://calteches.library.caltech.edu/51/2/CargoCult.htm for a very famous speech on exactly this topic. A lot of Feynman's writing touches on the same issue.

If you mean the musings of philosophers on epistemology, then I emphatically disagree. The philosophers in question generally have failed to demonstrate that they understand science. And when they venture into science, they generally fail to live up to the ideals that they proclaim that scientists should follow. As an example I direct you to the sight of Karl Popper arguing to the end of his days that quantum mechanics cannot be a correct scientific theory. An opinion that began because a probabilistic theory cannot in principle be falsified.

In fact QM is a scientific theory, and it stands as an example falsifying Popper's criterion for science!

I find it very ironic that Feynman is so disliked by philosophers for having been honest about how irrelevant they are to science. And philosophers in turn have failed to recognize Feynman's explanations of how to do science as a key topic that should be included in any proper philosophy of science.