alt Hacker NewsSurely this is a seccomp shortcoming, or kernel auth shortcoming, rather than an io_uring problem?
That is, seccomp is (apparently? I’ve never used it myself) capable of intercepting direct calls. Obviously, that design isn’t going to be able to handle “indirect” calls in its default implementation.
Either seccomp needs a way to act on the buffer or intercept io_uring calls, or there’s a need for a new auth mechanism that’s capable of handling io_uring style API’s.
Torpedoing the whole api (a la gcp) feels like throwing the baby out with the bath water.
That framing doesn't make sense. System calls and their arguments are an obvious security boundary and have been a sandboxing component for decades. io_uring blows that boundary apart. The "problem" is io_uring, not seccomp.
If you want to make a case for io_uring being benign for security, the right argument is probably against all unmediated shared-kernel multitenancy (ie: multitenancy either through virtualization, or WASM/V8-type language runtimes, and nothing else). It doesn't make sense to say system call filters are flawed because someone came up with an omni-syscall that breaks those filters.