The distinction between "statements about X" and "statements about statements about X" doesn't resolve the contradiction here, because the original claim makes a universal assertion about all possible true statements about God. By its own terms, it must encompass both:

1. First-order statements about God

2. Second-order statements about statements about God

3. All higher-order statements as well

Put differently: The claim "Nothing true can be said about God from a posture of defense" is asserting that there exists no level at which defensive truth claims about God are valid. But this assertion itself constitutes a defensive truth claim about God—whether at first, second, or any other order.

The attempt to escape via orders of statements fails because the original statement's scope explicitly covers all truth claims regarding God, regardless of their logical level. If it didn't cover all levels, then it would no longer be claiming that "nothing true can be said"—it would instead be claiming "some things true can be said, just not first-order things," which is a fundamentally different claim than the original.

So by attempting to exempt itself based on being "meta-level," the statement has already conceded that some true things can be said about God from a posture of defense (namely, meta-level things)—which directly contradicts its own absolute claim that nothing true can be said.

This is why universal claims about the impossibility of certain types of statements are often self-defeating—they cannot consistently exempt themselves from their own scope without undermining their universality.