alt Hacker NewsThinking about your argument a little more, it seems like our disagreement comes from your belief that "about X" is 'infectious' to all higher order statements, whereas I don't believe this is the case. The best way I can think to argue my point right now is from examples.
Suppose we had many books about movies on one hand, each book containing movie reviews or something, and then we have one book about [books about movies] on the other hand, call it B. The book B, which is about [books about movies], simply contains the number of words that each book about movies has written in it. Is B "about movies"? I would argue that it is not, it contains nothing about movies in it at all, just numbers describing other books. I can say "all books about movies are wrong" without meaning to refer to B, as B is not wrong (as long as the word-counting is correct).
Would you argue that B is "about movies"?
Your examples attempt to break the chain of "aboutness" between meta-levels of statements. But there's a crucial distinction your argument misses:
"Nothing true can be said about God from a posture of defense" isn't merely describing properties of statements like your examples do (word counts, colors). Instead, it's making a universal claim about POSSIBILITY itself, specifically, the impossibility of defensive true statements about God.
This raises a key question: What makes defensive truth claims about God impossible? This impossibility must stem from something about God's nature itself. Otherwise, what grounds the impossibility?
Your examples all involve contingent properties:
1) Book word counts are contingent features of books
2) color(X) = color(Y) involves contingent properties of objects
But the original statement makes a necessary claim about what kinds of truth claims about God are possible at all. This is fundamentally different because:
1) It rules out ALL possible defensive true statements about God 2) The basis for this universal impossibility must lie in God's nature 3) Therefore it necessarily makes a claim about God, not just about statements
This is why property inheritance examples don't apply here. The statement isn't claiming properties transfer between levels, it's making a universal claim about possibility itself that necessarily involves both statements about God AND God's nature.
While you've shown that descriptive properties don't transfer between meta-levels, this doesn't address the key issue: a claim about what statements about God are possible must ultimately be grounded in God's nature itself.