If I'm reading that right, the attack assumes the attacker has (among other things) a private key (IK) stored only on the user's device, and the user's password.
Thus, engaging on this attack would seem to require hardware access to one of the victims' devices (or some other backdoor), in which case you've already lost.
Correct me if I'm wrong, but that doesn't seem particularly dangerous to me? As always, security of your physical hardware (and not falling for phishing attacks) is paramount.
It sounds like all that's needed is a device that had been linked in the past. Unlinking doesn't have the security requirements you'd think it would and there's a phishing attack to make scanning a QR code trigger a device link (which seems really really bad if the user doesn't even have to take much action)
“Just install this chrome browser extension” is all it takes now. Hell, you can even access cookies and previously visited sites from within the browser. All it takes is some funky ad, or chrome extension, or some llama-powered toolbar to gain access to be able to do exactly that.
Background services on devices has been a thing for a while too. Install an app (which you grant all permissions to when asked) and bam, a self-restarting daemon service tracking your location, search history, photos, contacts, notes, email, etc
This is my read as well. Just double clicking here.
No, it means that if you approve a device to link, and you later have reason to unlink the device, you can't establish absolutely that the unlinked device can no longer access messages, or decrypt messages involving an account, breaking the forward-secrecy guarantees.
That leaves you with the only remedy for a signal account that has accepted a link to a 'bad device' being to burn the whole account. (maybe rotating safety numbers/keys would be sufficient, i am uncertain there) -- If you can prove the malicious link was only a link, then yeah, the attack i described is incomplete, but the issues in general with linked devices and remedies described are the important bits, I think.