> I interpret this, I think reasonably, to not include encrypted information
I disagree since attacks and leaks can happen/have happened which could compromise that data. Signal was already found to be vulnerable to CacheOut. Even ignoring that guessing or brute forcing a pin is all anyone would need to get a list of everyone a signal user has been in contact with. just having that data (and worse keeping it forever) is a risk that absolutely should be disclosed.
> I don't want to read them in depth. But it sounds like they are again ultimately saying "PIN+SGX is not secure enough".
that was my conclusion back when all this started. The glaring lie and omissions in their privacy policy were just salt in the wound, but charitably, it might be a dead canary intended to help warn people away from the service. Similarly dropping the popular feature of allowing unsecured sms/mms and introducing a crypto wallet nobody asked for might have also been done to discourage the apps use.
Okay, so you not only take issue with PIN+SGX, you think that any encryption scheme (at least from Signal) isn't secure enough. Your point still comes down to "they are storing sensitive information in a form that is ostensibly encrypted but still subject to attack (in the opinion of XYZ reputable people...)".
My point is only that the headline of your point was "they are lying about not storing sensitive information". That leaves out a very important part of your point. IMO it makes the claim seem sensationalized and starts you off on the wrong foot.