Pretty hard to square this perspective with the recent Raimondo decision, no?
Is the EPA, at the direction of the sitting president, making rules about coal power plants not an example of the use of "all executive power. All of it."? Or does A2S1 carve out exceptions for the EPA, even if it doesn't for those other agencies?
Whatever you think about Chevron deference or the specific EPA case I'm alluding to, the point is: The balance of power between the executive and legislative branches is nowhere near as clear cut as your comment suggests. Congress frequently legislates the structure and responsibilities of executive agencies. Presidential administrators cannot legally change those responsibilities unilaterally.
Making rules sounds awfully like legislation, which is a job for the legislature rather than the executive. Arguably, the executive can only regulate the executive, and Congress has to pass laws which apply to the populace at large.
That’s certainly not the way things have been run for a long time, but it doesn’t seem irrational to argue that’s the proper constitutional structure.