QUIC for the kernel

I recently had to add `ssl_preread_server_name` to my NGINX configuration in order to `proxy_pass` requests for certain domains to another NGINX instance. In this setup, the first instance simply forwards the raw TLS stream (with `proxy_protocol` prepended), while the second instance handles the actual TLS termination.

This approach works well when implementing a failover mechanism: if the default path to a server goes down, you can update DNS A records to point to a fallback machine running NGINX. That fallback instance can then route requests for specific domains to the original backend over an alternate path without needing to replicate the full TLS configuration locally.

However, this method won't work with HTTP/3. Since HTTP/3 uses QUIC over UDP and encrypts the SNI during the handshake, `ssl_preread_server_name` can no longer be used to route based on domain name.

What alternatives exist to support this kind of SNI-based routing with HTTP/3? Is the recommended solution to continue using HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2 over TLS for setups requiring this behavior?

I recall this article on QUIC disadvantages: https://www.reddit.com/r/programming/comments/1g7vv66/quic_i...

Seems like this is a step in the right direction to resole some of those issues. I suppose nothing is preventing it from getting hardware support in future network cards as well.

What will the socket API look like for multiple streams? I guess it is implied it is the same as multiple connections, with caching behind the scenes.

I would hope for something more explicit, where you get a connection object and then open streams from it, but I guess that is fine for now.

https://github.com/microsoft/msquic/discussions/4257 ah but look at this --- unless this is an extension, the server side can also create new streams, once a connection is established. The client creating new "connections" (actually streams) cannot abstract over this. Something fundamentally new is needed.

My guess is recvmsg to get a new file descriptor for new stream.

I don't know about using it in the kernel but I would love to see OpenSSH support QUIC so that I get some of the benefits of Mosh [1] while still having all the features of OpenSSH including SFTP, SOCKS, port forwarding, less state table and keep alive issues, roaming support, etc... Could OpenSSH leverage the kernel support?

[1] - https://mosh.org/

I thought nowadays every driver wants to be in userspace for exactly speed, especially network ones. So there's no overhead at kernel/userspace later. Strange this article claims the other way, I definitely miss something.

I have a question - bottleneck for TCP is said to the handshake. But that can be solved by reusing connections and/or multiplexing. The current implementation is 3-4x slower than the Linux impl and performance gap is expected to close.

If speed is touted as the advantage for QUIC and it is in fact slower, why bother with this protocol ? The author of the PR itself attributes some of the speed issues to the protocol design. Are there other problems in TCP that need fixing ?

I'm confused, I thought the revolution of the past decade or so was in moving network stacks to userspace for better performance.

What is the need for mashing more and more stuff into the kernel? I thought the job of the kernel was to manage memory, hardware, and tasks. Shouldn't protocols built on top of IP be handled by userland?

Looks good. Quick is a real game changer for many. Internet should be a little faster with it. Probably we will not care because of 5g, but still valuable. Wondering that there is a separate tow handshake, I was thinking that qick embeds tls, but seams like I am wrong.

The general web is slowed down by bloated websites. But I guess this can make game latency lower.

> Calls to bind(), connect(), listen(), and accept() can be used to initiate and accept connections in much the same way as with TCP, but then things diverge a bit. [...] The sendmsg() and recvmsg() system calls are used to carry out that setup

I wish the article explained why this approach was chosen, as opposed to adding a dedicated system call API that matches the semantics of QUIC.

This seems to be a categorical error, for reasons that are contained in the article itself. The whole appeal of QUIC is being immune to ossification, being free to change parameters of the protocol without having to beg Linux maintainers to agree.

That's so wrong, putting more and more stuff into the kernel and expanding attack surface. How long will it take before someone finds a vulnerability in QUIC handling?

The kernel should be as minimal as possible and everything that can be moved to userspace should be moved there. If you are afraid of performance issues then maybe you should stop using legacy processors with slow context switch timing.

Would this (eventually) include the unreliable datagram extension?

The article didn’t discuss ACK. I have often wondered if it makes sense for the protocol to not have ACKs, and to leave that up to the application layer. I feel like the application layer has to ensure this anyway, so I don’t know how much benefit it is to additionally support this at a lower layer.

> QUIC is meant to be fast, but the benchmark results included with the patch series do not show the proposed in-kernel implementation living up to that. A comparison of in-kernel QUIC with in-kernel TLS shows the latter achieving nearly three times the throughput in some tests. A comparison between QUIC with encryption disabled and plain TCP is even worse, with TCP winning by more than a factor of four in some cases.

Jesus, that's bad. Does anyone know if userspace QUIC implementations are also this slow?

[flagged]

For the love of god, can we please move to microkernel-based operating systems already? We're adding a million lines of code to the linux kernel every year. That's so much attack surface area. We're setting ourselves up for a kessler syndrome of sorts with every system that we add to the kernel.

Brace for unauthenticated remote execution exploits on network stack.

I've been hearing about QUIC for ages, yet it is still an obscure tech and will likely end up like IPv6.