alt Hacker News> A while ago, I collaborated on angulartics2, a shared repository where multiple people still had admin rights. That repo still contained a GitHub Actions secret — a npm token with broad publish rights. This collaborator had access to projects with other people which I believe explains some of the other 40 initial packages that were affected.
> A new Shai-Hulud branch was force pushed to angulartics2 with a malicious github action workflow by a collaborator. The workflow ran immediately on push (did not need review since the collaborator is an admin) and stole the npm token. With the stolen token, the attacker published malicious versions of 20 packages. Many of which are not widely used, however the @ctrl/tinycolor package is downloaded about 2 million times a week.
I still don't get it. An admin on angulartics2 gets hacked, his Github access is used to push a malicious workflow that extracts an npm token. But why would an npm token in angulartics2 have publication rights to tinycolor?
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> But why would an npm token in angulartics2 have publication rights to tinycolor?
Imo, this is one of the most classical ways organizations get pwned: That one sin from your youth years ago comes to bite you in the butt.
We also had one of these years ago. It wasn't the modern stack everyone was working to scan and optimize and keep us secure that allowed someone to upload stuff to our servers. It was the editor that had been replaced years and years ago, and it's replacement had also been replaced, the way it was packaged wasn't seen by the build-time security scans, but eventually someone found it with a URL scan. Whoopsie.
Sorry if that wasn't clear. This was a token with global publish rights to my npm packages.
I have admin rights on someone else’s npm repo and I’ve done most of the recent releases. Becoming admin lit a fire under me to fix all of the annoying things and shitty design decisions that have been stuck in the backlog for years so most of the commits are also mine. I don’t want my name on broken code that “works”.
I had just about convinced myself that we should be using a GitHub action to publish packages because there was always the possibility that publishing directly via 2FA, that one (or specifically I) could fuck up and publish something that wasn’t a snapshot of trunk.
But I worried about stuff like this and procrastinated on forcing the issue with the other admins. And it looks like the universe has again rewarded my procrastination. I don’t know what the answer is but giving your credentials to a third party clearly isn’t it.