> Unfortunately, the price LLM companies would have to pay to scrape every single Anubis deployment out there is approximately $0.00.
The math on the site linked here as a source for this claim is incorrect. The author of that site assumes that scrapers will keep track of the access tokens for a week, but most internet-wide scrapers don't do so. The whole purpose of Anubis is to be expensive for bots that repeatedly request the same site multiple times a second.
Right, but that's the point. It's not that the idea is bad. It's that PoW is the wrong fit for it. Internet-wide scrapers don't keep state? Ok, then force clients to do something that requires keeping state. You don't need to grind SHA2 puzzles to do that; you don't need to grind anything at all.
The point is that the scrapers can easily bypass this if they cared to do so
The "cost" of executing the JavaScript proof of work is fairly irrelevant, the whole concept just doesn't make sense with a pessimistic inspection. Anubis requires the users to do an irrelevant amount of sha256 hashes in slow javascript, where a scraper can do it much faster in native code; simply game over. It's the same reason we don't use hashcash for email, the amount of proof of work a user will tolerate is much lower than the amount a professional can apply. If this tool provides any benefit, it's due to it being obscure and non standard.
When reviewing it I noticed that the author carried the common misunderstanding that "difficulty" in proof of work is simply the number of leading zero bytes in a hash, which limits the granularity to powers of two. I realize that some of this is the cost of working in JavaScript, but the hottest code path seems to be written extremely inefficiently.
It wouldn’t be exaggerating to say that a native implementation of this with even a hair of optimization could reduce the “proof of work” to being less time intensive than the ssl handshake.