But most oil exports that are subsidizing the Russian economy and providing forex are being exported from the Russian Far East.
Hitting infra in Western Russia makes it painful for civilians and does have a psychological impact of highlighting to the Russia public how war has consequences, but by and large it doesn't do much given that Russia still has the capability to continue garnering foreign currency or operating with foreign markets.
Furthermore, those strikes aren't truly crippling [0] to Russian ONG capacity and the associated sanctions won't have much of an impact given how diversified Russian ONG companies are [1], with JVs and stakes in Western ambivalent countries like China, Congo, Egypt, Iraq, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and others.
The psychological impact of such strikes cannot be understated, but it's not really painful for Russia given that they have chosen to dig in and believe that they can win an economic war of attrition [2] as it stands. If the much more isolated Maduro regime in Venezuela or the Khamenei regime in Iran are able to hold onto power, it's hard to see how these strikes can impact that Putin regime in what has become a war of attrition, especially when regional powers like Vietnam have begun pivoting back to Russia [3], and larger powers like China [4] and India [5] are doubling down on Russian investments.
[0] - https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/1...
[1] - https://carnegieendowment.org/russia-eurasia/politika/2025/1...
[2] - https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-war-ukraine-next-chapt...
[3] - https://www.nytimes.com/2025/10/27/world/asia/3-takeaways-fr...
[4] - https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/power-of-siberia-2-rus...
[5] - https://www.reuters.com/world/india/india-signs-pact-with-sa...
Putin may not lose power, but may lose ability to keep the logistics of an invasion force. Also, none of those other countries are locked in a war of attrition.
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/business/2025/10/26/putin-fears-...