D. J. Bernstein is very well respected and for very good reason. And I don't have firsthand knowledge of the background here, but the blog posts about the incident have been written in a kind of weird voice that make me feel like I'm reading about the US Government suppressing evidence of Bigfoot or something.
Stuff like this
> Wow, look at that: "due process".... Could it possibly be that the people writing the law were thinking through how standardization processes could be abused?"
is both accusing the other party of bad faith and also heavily using sarcasm, which is a sort of performative bad faith.
Sarcasm can be really effective when used well. But when a post is dripping with sarcasm and accusing others of bad faith it comes off as hiding a weak position behind contempt. I don't know if this is just how DJB writes, or if he's adopting this voice because he thinks it's what the internet wants to see right now.
Personally, I would prefer a style where he says only what he means without irony and expresses his feelings directly. If showing contempt is essential to the piece, then the Linus Torvalds style of explicit theatrical contempt is probably preferable, at least to me.
I understand others may feel differently. The style just gives me crackpot vibes and that may color reception of the blog posts to people who don't know DJT's reputation.
He’s smart and prolific, for sure, but I lost respect for him several years ago.
It's very simple.
ECC is well understood and has not been broken over many years.
ML-KEM is new, and hasn't had the same scrutiny as ECC. It's possible that the NSA already knows how to break this, and has chosen not to tell us, and NIST plays the useful idiot.
NIST has played the useful idiot before, when it promoted Dual_EC_DRBG, and the US government paid RSA to make it the default CSPRNG in their crypto libraries for everyone else... but eventually word got out that it's almost certainly an NSA NOBUS special, and everyone started disabling it.
Knowing all that, and planning for a future where quantum computers might defeat ECC -- it's not defeated yet, and nobody knows when in the future that might happen... would you choose:
Option A): encrypt key exchange with ECC and the new unproven algorithm
Option B): throw out ECC and just use the new unproven algorithm
NIST tells you option B is for the best. NIST told you to use Dual_EC_DRBG. W3C adopted EME at the behest of Microsoft, Google and Netflix. Microsoft told you OOXML is a valid international standard you should use instead of OpenDocument (and it just so happens that only one piece of software, made by Microsoft, correctly reads and writes OOXML). So it goes on. Standards organisations are very easily corruptable when its members are allowed to have conflicts of interest and politick and rules-lawyer the organisation into adopting their pet standards.