I'm not a CISO just a random dog on the internet, but this open letter seems to assume that privacy is not a part of your security posture and that spear phishing isn't common these days. (Is 'spear phishing' still the term for targeted electronic scams to steal credentials/access?)
I realize not everyone is using a physically stripped burner, a graphene os install, etc and not everyone works at a high value financial, govt, or infra target but for those of us who need to deal with opsec or are commonly targeted by spear phishing this advice seems abysmal.
In the current political climate of the US, if you are living or traveling here and the current party isn't cheering for you personally, you really should be considering both state-sponsored attacks and no longer have the luxury of assuming good faith by the state. Telling people to enable cheap drive by attacks that are in active use by certain government agencies is irresponsible malpractice at best and actively evil at worst.
Source: I've worked at analytics companies that actively deanonymized users using cookies when available. We used wifi and Bluetooth details when available. We built "multi channel marketing" which was just taking any information we could scrape from the user to fingerprint them and cross reference and deanonymize them so we could sell interactions to businesses like geofenced price discrimination, value of users, and could offer cross website information on shopping habits/financial profile. The shit I did 15 years ago didn't go away and no matter how much I wish I didn't write that, it was the tip of the iceberg and relatively benign.
The piece is explicitly about retiring outdated security advice and doesn't claim to provide a complete, coherent defensive posture (that posture would have to depend on who you are and what your threat model is!). I don't like that they included the "recommendations for the public" section, but I don't think there's a reasonable way to read it as intending to be a complete action plan.