>this also creates a situation where anything said across federation cannot be unsaid, which is an ironic situation for a protocol/system that often comes up when talking about privacy.
How is it ironic? No protocol in the world can force anyone to delete anything from their own device. Chat apps that implement this function are either proprietary (so you cannot control what they can do) or, if OSS, do it on a pinky-promise-basis.
A protocol can mandate forced deletion. A particular client implementation may ignore it, or some users may circumvent it, so it would be a weaker kind of feature, but still a feature. And depending on circumstances it can be quite useful.
Right, but we did have efforts to take over hardware security enclaves to deliver user data, instead of copyrighted company data, to user devices.
Tim Berners-Lee tries to make the internet a place where you can choose, what it "forgets". At least that were the news I got from the 2010s and early 2020s. As for how: DRM-like tech in the hands of users should allow for that.
So having privacy by design would be nice, and e.g. many messengers try to do "it is inconvenient to copy a message that someone send you that is marked as view-only-once-or-up-to-a-timespan, but of course, you can use an external camera, i.e. make more low-fidelity copies or even exfiltrate data".
Even F/LOS software can use/would be forced to use these proprietary enclaves or at least non-user accessible key stores. (As far as I understand hardware level DRM.)
Yeah I thought this was a weird take too. Too often people take privacy for "I can do what I like". IMO deleting something you've sent to someone else is not a privacy concern at all.
> How is it ironic? No protocol in the world can force anyone to delete anything from their own device.
You may have noticed the constant pushing to remove the user's access to their "own" device.
Forcing people to delete things from their own device is the whole concept of the Snapchat protocol, for example. Snapchat fortunately doesn't offer an OS and can't meaningfully be part of this push, but they make a convenient illustration.
You can check out Snapchat's bug bounty policy here: https://hackerone.com/snapchat . On the list of ineligible vulnerabilities is "screenshot detection avoidance". That's not a bug (because there's nothing they can do about it), even though it is their product's selling point.
Sometimes stronger companies want similar things, and they try to do something about it.
> No protocol in the world can force anyone to delete anything from their own device.
But they either do not sign the messages or allow repudiating the signatures. Matrix signs all events forever.
Matrix also makes the entire event history (minus message content depending on room configuration) available to servers on join, even if that server's users are not allowed to see it.