> Has private equity ever done anything good for anyone outside of the investors?
If it's not publicly traded, it's super secure from any public accountability.
And while I'm increasingly hostile toward the shareholder model, we do get one transparency breadcrumb from this (gov managed) contrivance: The Earnings Call
Earnings Calls give us worthwhile amounts of internal information that we'd never get otherwise - info that often conflicts with public statements and reports to govs.
Like CapEx expenditures/forecast and the actual reasons that certain segments over/underperform. It's a solid way to catch corporations issuing bald-faced lies (for any press, public, gov that are paying attention).
AT&T PR: Net Neutrality is tanking our infra investment
ATT's EC: CapEx is high and that will continue
I'll bet 1 share that there are moves to get this admin to do away with the requirement.>If it's not publicly traded, it's super secure from any public accountability.
Under the existing legal and regulatory model, yes.
But what abusing that model long-term will eventually result in government-level change that effectively bans the existence of such exploits, wide-spread vigilantism, and/or some sort of collapse.
I'd even go so far as to say that shareholding in PUBLICLY TRADED companies is one of the primary engines of enshittification. Shareholders want to extract rents from the ecosystem, full stop. And if the CEO isn't sociopathic enough about it, they’ll replace them with one who is. Everyone who buys shares at price X wants to sell at >X, forever. That incentive structure alone guarantees a race to the bottom.
How to fix it: let shareholders be gradually bought out—much as slaveholders in Europe were—by (gasp) utility tokenholders. Think Shares in Disney Corp vs Disney Dollars. You transition from extractive shareholders to people who actually use and depend on the ecosystem. That eliminates the parasitic shareholder class that drives most of late-stage capitalist enshittification, rent extraction, and negative externalities.
For clarity, here are just some of those externalities that flow directly from quarterly-earnings-driven incentives:
destruction of ecosystems
deforestation and rainforest loss
collapse of fisheries and ocean systems
factory farming / industrialized animal suffering
desertification of farmland
strip mining and toxic waste dumping
privatization and depletion of freshwater
carbon emissions and climate destabilization
environmental injustice and poisoning of local communities
lobbying to block regulation and accountability
social media addiction design for engagement metrics
monopolization and killing off smaller competitors
offshoring, wage stagnation, and worker precarity
financialization of everything (housing, healthcare, education)
political capture to preserve the whole machine
This is not some random accident, this is the inevitable equilibrium of shareholder primacy.The entire model of late-stage shareholding is flawed. Corporations exist because governments grant them charters. Government sets the rules for how shares work—and can change those rules. Buying shares is not like buying bonds. Shares are residual claims with far higher risk. So we can absolutely add another risk: that shareholders may be gradually bought out and the institution wound down, the same way the FDR administration forced private gold holders into a buyout under the Gold Reserve Act.
That was far more authoritarian, because gold is a physical asset you own in self-custody. Shares, on the other hand, only exist because a third-party company continues to operate in ways that profit you. That dependency already implies higher risk. Therefore, we can add the additional risk of a structured, government-mandated transition away from extractive shareholder capitalism—just like Europe did when ending slavery. And let's be honest: late-stage financialized shareholding has been a blight on the planet.
And none of this is historically radical. Before the modern era, the idea that shareholders should dominate everything simply didn’t exist.
Pre-1960s:For much of the 20th century, a broader "stakeholder theory" was the norm. Management balanced employees, customers, suppliers, and communities—not just shareholders.
1960s:The turn began with Milton Friedman’s argument that a company’s only responsibility is maximizing shareholder profits (1970 NYT Magazine). 1980s:Shareholder primacy took over.
Hostile takeovers forced boards into short-termism.
Executive compensation was tied tightly to stock price.
Financialization embedded all of this into corporate DNA.
Shareholders were not always in control. Their dominance "waxed and waned," and the current form of shareholder primacy is a late-20th-century financial ideology posing as an eternal law of nature.If that ideology got us enshittification, ecological collapse, and a sociopathic corporate culture, then yes, we can fix it the same way other harmful institutions were fixed: buy the incumbents out and transition to a saner governance model.
>I'll bet 1 share...
I won't be your counterparty on that bet, you've already won:
https://www.forbes.com/sites/saradorn/2025/09/15/trump-wants...
One of the reasons cited? All the work it takes. Which is just an insane response. If your business is so poorly run and organized that reconciling things each quarter represents a disproportionate amount of effort, something is very wrong. It means you definitely don't know what's going on, because by definition you can't know, not outside those 4 times a year. In which case there's a reasonable chance the requirement to do so is the only thing that's kept it from going off the rails.