alt Hacker NewsI don't buy this at all:
> otherwise, the implication is the only thing the President can do with principal officers is to ask them for an opinion.
That's not at all the implication... how do you even reach that conclusion? The obvious implication is that the president can only do what he is legally permitted, which means he could do whatever Congress provides for in law, in addition to what's in the constitution. Because, you know, his job is to execute the law. And Congress and the constitution are the ones establishing the legal framework for agencies.
> This I consider as a mere redundancy in the plan; as the right for which it provides would result of itself from the office.
It's nice that Hamilton thought that, but what did those who wrote it think? It seems safe to assume they wrote it for a reason, not as fluff. Which brings us to...
> Some modern scholars think the provision, though functionally redundant, is there to address a dispute that arose during the debates about executive councils [...] the clause is there not to describe what the principal officers must do, but what the President need not do. The President may but does not need to consult his principal officers before taking action.
It's great some modern scholars think this, but this also isn't compelling. If that's what they wanted... they could and should have just said that directly, not left it as a historical puzzle for people to speculate about.
> That's not at all the implication... how do you even reach that conclusion? The obvious implication is that the president can only do what he is legally permitted, which means he could do whatever Congress provides for in law, in addition to what's in the constitution
The constitution doesn’t list any other supervisory powers the president has over officers. So if the Opinions Clause isn’t redundant, Congress needs to spell out all other supervisory authority, down to something as little as asking for opinions.
That reading isn’t just inconsistent with the unitary executive view, it’s inconsistent with every other common view of how the executive works. It would not only mean that Congress can create independent agencies, but that all cabinet officers are independent by default. Nobody seriously thinks that’s true, but that’s the implication of the non-redundant reading of the Opinions Clause.
It’s true that the framers probably didn’t put a redundant power in there just for funsies. But it’s also true that drafters don’t hide elephants in molehills. Article II only mentions executive officers in passing. It would be very odd if the drafters meant to invest them with tremendous independent power only by implication.