alt Hacker NewsNo, the search space is tiny: you can just attack 1 BPE at a time! Stuff like password guessing is almost trivial when you get to do a timing attack on each successive character. So that lets you quickly exfiltrate arbitrary numbers of prompts, especially if you have any idea what you are looking for. (Note that a lot of prompts are already public information, or you can already exfiltrate prompts quite easily from services and start attacking from there...)
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IanCal • yesterday at 8:38 PM
Do any providers do this level of granularity? Anthropic require explicit cache markers, for example.
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Hill climbing a password would only be possible if intermediate KV cache entries were stored. To hillclimb "hunter2", you're going to try "a", "b", "c", etc, until you notice that "h" comes back faster. Then you try "ha", "hb" and so on.
But that's only going to work if the cache looks like: "h", "hu", "hun", ..., "hunter2"
If just "hunter2" is in the cache, you won't get any signal until you stumble on exactly that password. And that's before getting into the block size granularity of the caches discussed elsewhere in this thread.
That's not to say timing attacks aren't possible. I haven't looked at Claude Code's prompt generation, but there's no intrinsic reason why you couldn't do things like figure out what open source code and research papers your competitors are loading into context.
Sharing caches between orgs would be an incredible misstep.