Their view that security bugs are just normal bugs remains very immature and damaging. It it somewhat mitigated by Linux having so many eyes on it and so many developers, but a lot of problems in the past could have bee avoided if they adopted the stance the rest of the industry recognizes as correct.
Classifying bugs as security bugs is just theater - and any company or organization that tries to classify bugs that way is immature and hasn't put any thought into it.
First of all "security" is undefined. Second, nearly every bug can be be exploited in a malicious way, but that way is usually not easy to find. So should every bug be classified as a security bug?
Or should only bugs where a person can think of a way on the spot during triage to exploit that bug as a security bug? In that case only a small subset of your "security" bugs are classified as such.
It is meaningless in all cases.
Linus has been very clear on avoiding the opposite, which is the OpenBSD situation: they obsess about security so much that nothing else matters to them, which is how you end up with a mature 30 year old OS that still has a dogshit unreliable filesystem in 2026.
To paraphrase LT, security bugs are important, but so are all the other bugs.
This feels almost too obvious to be worth saying, but “the rest of the industry” does not in fact have a uniform shared stance on this.
The rest of the industry relies on following a CVE list and ticking off vulnerabilities as a way to ensure "owners" are correctly assigned risk and sign it off - because there is nothing else that "owners" could do. The whole security through CVE is broken and is designed to be useful to create large "security organizations" that have the single purpose of annoying everyone with reports without solving any issues.
“A bug is a bug” is about communication and prioritization, not ignoring security. Greg’s post spells that out pretty clearly.
> a lot of problems in the past could have bee avoided
Such as?
did you read it? because that's not their view at all
From their perspective, on their project, with the constraints they operate under, bugs are just bugs. You're free to operationalize some other taxonomy of bugs in your organization; I certainly wouldn't run with "bugs are just bugs" in mine (security bugs are distinctive in that they're paired implicitly with adversaries).
To complicate matters further, it's not as if you could rely on any more "sophisticated" taxonomy from the Linux kernel team, because they're not the originators of most Linux kernel security findings, and not all the actual originators are benevolent.