> To escalate privileges, we abused the token’s repo scope, which can manage repository collaborators, and invited our own GitHub user to be a repository administrator.
From everything I know about pentesting, they should have stopped before doing this, right? From https://hackerone.com/aws_vdp?type=team :
> You may only interact with accounts you own or with explicit written permission from AWS or the account owner
This comes entirely down to the scope of the agreement for the assessment. Some teams are looking for you to identify and exploit vulns in order to demonstrate the potential impact that those vulnerabilities could have.
This is oftentimes political. The CISO wants additional budget for secure coding training and to hire more security engineers, let the pentesting firm demonstrate a massive compromise and watch the dollars roll in.
A lot of time, especially in smaller companies, it's the opposite. No one is responsible for security and customers demand some kind of audit. "Don't touch anything we don't authorize and don't do anything that might impact our systems without explicit permissions."
Wiz is a very prominent cloud security company who probably has incredibly lucrative contracts with AWS already, and their specialty, as I understand it, is identifying full "kill chains" in cloud environments. From access issues all the way to compromise of sensitive assets.
It’s possible that AWS is a Wiz customer, which would allow them to do more stuff.
I think it comes down to what you do with the access. Since this is a public repo I don't think I'd be too upset at the addition of a new admin so long as they didn't do anything with that access. It's a good way to prove the impact. If it were a private repo I might feel differently.