Not true. There is no requirement that the user be incapable of cloning or recreating the possession. That's an additional constraint that some parties choose to impose for various reasons (some understandable, some BS).
In the end it's all just hidden information. The question is the difficulty an attacker would face attempting to exfiltrate that information. Would he require physical access to the device? For how long? Etc.
If the threat model is a stranger on the other side of an ocean using a leaked password to log in to my bank account but I use TOTP with a password manager (or even, god forbid, SMS codes) then the attack will be thwarted. However both of those (TOTP and SMS) are vulnerable to a number of threat models that a hardware token isn't.
Not true. There is no requirement that the user be incapable of cloning or recreating the possession. That's an additional constraint that some parties choose to impose for various reasons (some understandable, some BS).
In the end it's all just hidden information. The question is the difficulty an attacker would face attempting to exfiltrate that information. Would he require physical access to the device? For how long? Etc.
If the threat model is a stranger on the other side of an ocean using a leaked password to log in to my bank account but I use TOTP with a password manager (or even, god forbid, SMS codes) then the attack will be thwarted. However both of those (TOTP and SMS) are vulnerable to a number of threat models that a hardware token isn't.