Yes, yes, it technically didn’t but the result was largely the same, and as we all know technically correct is the best kind of correct.
> The final resolution, unanimously adopted by the North Atlantic Council on September 12, was a compromise that only contingently invoked Article 5, dependent on a later determination that the attacks had originated from abroad.[7] According to the final text of the declaration, "if it is determined that this attack was directed from abroad against the United States, it shall be regarded as an action covered by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty".
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2001_NATO_Article_5_contingenc...
Does this rise to the level of misinformation? I doubt it. It’s administrative trivia only of interest to UN enthusiasts.
It's hardly administrative trivia; the thrust of this argument is widely cited as an example of European NATO states helping to defend the US in a time of need. But the article you cited is replete with examples of US ambivalence, if not outright disinterest in a coordinated NATO action:
> On the evening of September 11, 2001, NATO's Secretary General, the Baron Robertson of Port Ellen, contacted United States Secretary of State Colin Powell with the suggestion that declaring an Article 5 contingency would be a useful political statement for the alliance to make in response to the attacks earlier that day. Powell indicated the United States had no interest in making such a request to the alliance, but would look favorably on such a declaration were NATO to independently initiate it.
[...]
> In one interagency meeting in which the option of tapping NATO forces for the planned U.S. military campaign was mentioned, U.S. Gen. Tommy Franks reportedly dismissed the idea by saying "I don't have the time to become an expert on the Danish Air Force". In a September 20, 2001 appearance before the North Atlantic Council, United States Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage bluntly stated that his presence was to convey information only and he "didn't come here to ask for anything".
> Several weeks later, on October 2, 2001, the North Atlantic Council issued a further resolution affirming that the September 11 attack originated from outside the United States. The United States privately dismissed the resolution, with one senior official reportedly commenting "I think it's safe to say that we won't be asking SACEUR to put together a battle plan for Afghanistan".
And indeed, immediately following your cited paragraph:
> No action resulted from NATO's September 12 resolution.
Finally:
> According to the RAND Corporation, NATO hoped that by invoking Article 5 the United States would invite NATO states to participate in its planned military response against Al Qaeda, though no such invitation ultimately materialized and "NATO did not contribute any of its collective assets to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan". American reticence to involve NATO states was due to its perception that NATO's previous intervention in the Kosovo War was an inefficient example of "war by committee". For their part, European states felt U.S. standoffishness in accepting multilateral support was emblematic of American "arrogance".
> In response to a request by the United Nations, NATO later raised and deployed the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) with the objective of stabilizing Afghanistan following the United States invasion of that country. ISAF operated under a NATO flag but was composed primarily of U.S. forces and was at all times under operational command of American officers. It continued operations in Afghanistan until 2014, withdrawing seven years prior to the United States' 2021 retreat and the ensuing Taliban victory.