alt Hacker NewsThis is your blog post, so I'll ask you a question. What are you trying to state in Belief #1? The message is unclear to me with how it's worded:
> In this table, in the "iCloud Backup (including device and Messages backup)" row, under "Standard data protection",
> the "Encryption" column reads "In transit & on server". Yes, this means that Apple can read all of your messages
> out of your iCloud backups.
This shadow device would have it's own keys to read messages sent to your iCloud account. To my knowledge, there's nothing in the security model to prevent this.
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The table has two categorizations: "In transit & on server" and "End-to-end". The former, which covers iCloud backups in the default configuration, is explicitly NOT end-to-end, meaning there are moments in time during processing where the data is not encrypted.
However, iCloud backups actually are listed as "End-to-end" if you turn on the new Advanced Data Protection feature.
Or Apple can also push an update, which you can't refuse, that upon first message to iCloud just uploads your private key. It's a bit foolish to count on encryption implemented by the adversary you're trying to hide from. Of course, this will most likely only affect individuals targeted by state-level actors.
This shadow device would have it's own keys to read messages sent to your iCloud account. To my knowledge, there's nothing in the security model to prevent this.
Matthew Green has some great posts about iMessage security. This one describes the key lookup issue:
https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2015/09/09/lets-tal...
Looking at the linked Apple Platform Security, it seems like the Apple Identity Service is still used as a public key directory.