So, let me get this straight. If I've been lazy, postponed updates and I'm still on 8.5.8 (Oct 2023) - it turns out I'm actually...safer?
Anyway, I hope the author can be a bit more specific about what actually has happened to those unlucky enough to have received these malicious updates. And perhaps a tool to e.g. do a checksum of all Notepad++ files, and compare them to the ones of a verified clean install of the user's installed version, would be a start? Though I would assume these malicious updates would be clever enough to rather have dropped and executed additional files, rather than doing something with the Notepad++ binaries themselves.
And I agree with another comment here. With all those spelling mistakes that notification kind of reads like it could have been written by a state-sponsored actor. Not to be (too) paranoid here, but can we be sure that this is the actual author, and that the new version isn't the malicious one?
> So, let me get this straight. If I've been lazy, postponed updates and I'm still on 8.5.8 (Oct 2023) - it turns out I'm actually...safer?
Is this surprising? My model is that keeping with the new versions is generally more dangerous than sticking with an old version, unless that old version has specific known and exploitable vulnerabilities.
>I'm still on 8.5.8 (Oct 2023) - it turns out I'm actually...safer?
Notepad++ site says The incident began from June 2025.
On their downloads page, 8.8.2 was the first update in June 2025 (the previous update 8.8.1 was released 2025-05-05)
So, if your installed version is 8.8.1 or lower, then you should be safe. Assuming that they're right about when the incident began.
edit: Notepad++ has published, on Github, SHA256 hashes of all the binaries for all download versions, which should let users check if they were targeted, if they still have the downloaded file. 8.8.1 is here, for example - https://github.com/notepad-plus-plus/notepad-plus-plus/relea...
> And perhaps a tool to e.g. do a checksum of all Notepad++ files, and compare them to the ones of a verified clean install of the user's installed version, would be a start?
Did I understand the attack wrongly? The software could have a 100% correct checksum, because the attack happened in a remote machine that deals with call home events from Notepad++, I guess one of those "Telemetry" add-ons. The attackers did a MITM to Notepad++ traffic.
If there’s anything I’ve learned from IBM, Red Hat, and CentOS, it’s that bleeding edge is actually what I’m supposed to want.
This reminds me of college, when some of my professors were still sorting out their curriculum and would give us homework assignments with bugs in it.
I complained many times that they were enabling my innate procrastination by proving over and over again that starting the homework early meant you would get screwed. Every time I'd wait until the people in the forum started sounding optimistic before even looking at the problem statement.
I still think I'd like to have a web of trust system where I let my friends try out software updates first before I do, and my relatives let me try them out before they do.