alt Hacker NewsHow would dialback-over-TLS be "more vulnerable to MITM" though? I think that claim was what led to the confusion, I don't see how TLS-with-client-EKU is more secure then TLS-with-dialback
How would dialback-over-TLS be "more vulnerable to MITM" though? I think that claim was what led to the confusion, I don't see how TLS-with-client-EKU is more secure then TLS-with-dialback
Firstly, nobody is actually calling for authentication using client certificates. We use "normal" server certificates and validate the usual way, the only difference is that such a certificate may be presented on the "client" side of a connection when the connection is between two servers.
The statement that dialback is generally more susceptible to MITM is based on the premise that it is easier to MITM a single victim XMPP server (e.g. hijack its DNS queries or install an intercepting proxy somewhere on the path between the two servers) than it is to do the same attack to Let's Encrypt, which has various additional protections such as performing verification from multiple vantage points, always using DNSSEC, etc.