>then that's a tautology, not an argument.

No. That's the definition of damage. "Change" doesn't imply loss. Damage does. With change you can add and/or subtract characteristics. Damage subtracts, it is a more precise term for the examples you gave. Using such a broad term as "change" makes it a euphemism for damage. A bit dishonest really.

>I didn't say everyone was ok with every change.

Neither did I.

>"different strokes for different folks" take.

Dead folks included? That's absurd. Also, who is comfortable losing a decade of memories? Is "comfort" a euphemism for "acceptance due to not having a choice on the matter"?

>Different people how (have) different opinions on what constitutes the self.

Because no one asks the dead guy! (tongue in cheek)

>You're equivocating

How can you be so sure? I have has much right to have an opinion on what constitutes the self as much as you do. Equivocating would imply that my opinion on what constitutes the self is based on an error, a misunderstanding. But you don't even know my opinion on that, we haven't got to it yet.

>Society has generally been

If that were the case then there would be no argument. All opinions opposed to accepting whatever comes out of this process as the same person are hereby dismissed due to tradition. Society has generally been such and such. It's settled then.

>Again, you're assuming

No, it is you who's assuming you know my opinion on this.

Glad you asked, here's my opinion:

Continuity. The ship of Theseus (with all planks and everything replaced) will always be the same ship. The copy of the ship of Theseus built right next to the original won't become the original ship of Theseus just because the original is destroyed.

The process destroys the original. This does not promote the copy to original status. It breaks continuity. If the original wasn't destroyed, the copied person and the original are easily distinguished by the people who witnessed the process since both cannot occupy the same space at the same time, one of them is definitely more to the left than the other, at least.

Now for the original and the copy, both will think they are the original if there's no information that satisfies them both about who's who. I would consider that lying to either one of them about their status is a serious crime.

But in this process, there's definitely a corpse left behind. Probably not complete since the copying is destructive to the brain. But the existence of a corpse will definitely convince the copy is the copy. The copy might stubbornly refuse to accept it as such, but that's on them and they are responsible for the consequences that stance might bring.

This proposed technology is messy. They don't even advertise a copy. Just a scan that could one day maybe used to make a "copy"(within questionable standards of what constitutes a copy in the future). That makes things easy for me, really. If it was a teletransportation paradox (without the killing part) then I'd have to accept that the original and the copy are the same, atom for atom, and now there's simply two of them, like a string of bytes on a computer, neither is the original or the copy and they are just the same individual that start diverge due to the impossibility of both occupying the same space at the same time, yada yada yada. But this isn't that, it's the cheap, oh so cheap knock off that only a sad few will settle for. If ever.

So no, I'm not equivocating death with the end of the self. This is just not a teletransportation paradox situation. The technology the article presents is not even close to make an atom for atom copy of a person. Furthermore, I figure if we ever reach that level of technology, we won't need to let the original die to make a copy, we could just cure whatever they are suffering from.

And finally, I would settle for a not so perfect copy of a brain scenario. Magic "Nanobots" replacing the neurons of a subject in vivo, gradually over the span of a few days/weeks/months. The new neurons can be non-biological, but must work identically to the original ones and obviously the connectome should be identical. The subject would be asked if they feel ok with this process regularly and the general part of the brain that is responsible for answering that question would be the last part to be replaced, otherwise it would be cheating wouldn't it? On completion, I would assume it's the same person and if it was me I would assume I'm the same person. This preserves continuity (of the self) to my personal satisfaction. Anything less than that is cryonics-level of bull**.