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cedwsyesterday at 2:26 PM4 repliesview on HN

This is the security shortcuts of the past 50 years coming back to bite us. Software has historically been a world where we all just trust each other. I think that’s coming to an end very soon. We need sandboxing for sure, but it’s much bigger than that. Entire security models need to be rethought.


Replies

1313ed01yesterday at 2:44 PM

This assumes that we can get a locked down, secure, stable bedrock system and sandbox that basically never changes except for tiny security updates that can be carefully inspected by many independent parties.

Which sounds great, but the way things work now tend to be the exact opposite of that, so there will be no trustable platform to run the untrusted code in. If the sandbox, or the operating system the sandbox runs in, will get breaking changes and force everyone to always be on a recent release (or worse, track main branch) then that will still be a huge supply chain risk in itself.

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klibertpyesterday at 4:13 PM

The NIH syndrome becoming best practice (a commenter below already says they "vibe-coded replacements for many dependencies") would also save quite a few jobs, I suspect. Fun times.

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georgestrakhovyesterday at 3:09 PM

I've been thinking the same thing. And it's somewhat parallel to what happened to meditation vs. drugs. In the old world the dangerous insights required so many years of discipline that you could sort of trust that the person getting the insight would be ok. But then any idiot can get the insight by just eating some shrooms and oops, that's a problem. Mostly self-harm problem in that case. But the dynamic is somewhat similar to what's happening now with LLMs and coding.

Software people could (mostly) trust each other's OSS contributions because we could trust the discipline it took in the first place. Not any more.

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ting0yesterday at 6:42 PM

What we need is accountability and ties to real-world identity.

If you're compromised, you're burned forever in the ledger. It's the only way a trust model can work.

The threat of being forever tainted is enough to make people more cautious, and attackers will have no way to pull off attacks unless they steal identities of powerful nodes.

Like, it shouldn't be a thing that some large open-source project has some 4th layer nested dependency made by some anonymous developer with 10 stars on Github.

If instead, the dependency chain had to be tied to real verified actors, you know there's something at stake for them to be malicious. It makes attacks much less likely. There's repercussions, reputation damage, etc.

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