China’s Edge in an Oil Shock: Electric Cars and Renewables - https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/14/business/china-oil-cars.h... | https://archive.today/UBP8L - March 16th, 2026
Implications of the Conflict in the Middle East for China’s Energy Security - https://www.energypolicy.columbia.edu/implications-of-the-co... - March 4th, 2026
Ember Energy: China - https://ember-energy.org/countries-and-regions/china/ - February 2026
China’s LNG imports were dropping before this crisis.
China’s LNG imports fell 12% in 2025 despite remaining world’s top buyer - https://www.icis.com/explore/resources/news/2025/12/30/11168... - December 30th, 2025
(I agree there will be some pain, but argue that China has sufficiently prepared for a fossil supply chain disruption of this magnitude, while also having the industrial state capacity to achieve a more favorable long term trajectory; they are deploying ~400GW+ of renewables annually at current deployment rates)
> argue that China has sufficiently prepared for a fossil supply chain disruption of this magnitude
Where we agree is in China having massively reduced the impact of this shock. (And, probably, in them succeeding in insulating themselves completely within a generation.)
Where we don't is in this still being a stagflationary hit to China and, probably, a worse economic hit to them than it will be to us.
Put more succinctly, the first and second derivatives are massively favourable. But the actual level still produces lots of vulnerability. China will be better off than its neighbours. But it's still going to get screwed even if the war ends tomorrow, which it isn't.