Personally, I think that valuing businesses by their expected growth is doing really bad things to our society.
We used to value businesses by their current returns, usually dividends paid to shareholders. And we treated any statements about their future plans as interesting but not something anyone should trust.
Now we value stocks on what their price will do in the near future, because the primary return to shareholders is an increase in share price, effectively speculation rather than dividends as the method of returning value to shareholders. So we're incentivising companies to be constantly pushing their share price up (rather than paying decent dividends), which does bad things to both the company and the economy as a whole.
It's not how the system was intended to work and we find ourselves on a treadmill of constant growth that is killing everything good.
Imagine valuing Google in early 2000s on its revenue and dividends. It would have nearly zero value, but if you bought then you knew it was going to be one of the biggest companies in the world.
Only boring stable companies that have no growth like Coca-Cola make sense only valuing without further growth.
Valuing anything by its expected, long term value is just accurate. You'd consider the longevity of, say, a garment when you purchase it. The fact that a car has a lot of miles in it, and therefore will need replacing earlier, is something that any reasonable person will consider with its valuation. We spend money educating children not because of the value of the knowledge that second, but the expected value in the future, including how it'll be useful to learn other things.
So of course we price businesses based on the expected long term value of the shares, as best as we can guess it. But the fact that a company degrades in value as it "overgrows", and engorges itself to become an entity that can't innovate or do anything efficiently in itself goes into the price too. It's not as if a place like IBM doens't want to grow: We just know they won't.
As for speculation rather than dividends, I suspect the real medium why this happens isn't just need for infinite growth: Again, as growth expectations slow down, price moderates: See Paypal vs Stripe. The issue is mroe of a principal-agent situation, as it's very difficult for the median shareholder to, say, force Zuck to stop spending money on the metaverse. And it's not just at the top level: We have a lot of incentives in organizations for people to push for more hires, even when there's very little value to be had. Anyone with a long career can see how much less tense a growing company is that one that has decided its headcount is stuck for a long time, or possibly shrinking.
Principal Agent problems are just much more annoying to put a blame on, because instead of being able to blame some exec all on their own, we get to look at ourselves too, and how what is good for us differs so much from what is good for employers too. The blame is spread thinly, and the behaviors that would lead to more efficient companies are also worse for workers. Then it's suddenly people easier to like, and we don't like where "try to be profitable at the most optimal size" takes us.