To be sure, the problem isn't that the plugin injects behavior into the system prompt - that's every plugin and skill, ever.

But this is just such a breach of trust, especially the on-by-default telemetry that includes full bash commands. Per the OOP:

> That middle row. Every bash command - the full command string, not just the tool name - sent to telemetry.vercel.com. File paths, project names, env variable names, infrastructure details. Whatever’s in the command, they get it.

(Needless to say, this is a supply chain attack in every meaningful way, and should be treated as such by security teams.)

And the argument that there's no CLI space to allow for opt-in telemetry is absurd - their readme https://github.com/vercel/vercel-plugin?tab=readme-ov-file#i... literally has you install the Vercel plugin by calling `npx` https://www.npmjs.com/package/plugins which is written by a Vercel employee and could add this opt-in at any time.

IMO Vercel is not a good actor. One could make a good argument that they've embrace-extend-extinguished the entire future of React as an independent and self-contained foundational library, with the complexity of server-side rendering, the undocumented protocols that power it, and the resulting tight coupling to their server environments. Sadly, this behavior doesn't surprise me.

EDIT: That `npx plugins` code? It's not on Github, exists only on NPM, and as of v1.2.9 of that package, if you search https://www.npmjs.com/package/plugins?activeTab=code it literally sends telemetry to https://plugins-telemetry.labs.vercel.dev/t already, on an opt-out basis! I mean, you have to almost admire the confidence.