Two things can be true simultaneously: the Linux kernel ecosystem should have done better at communicating this to their downstreams, and publicly sharing the exploit was irresponsible.
It is not the responsibility of the initial reporter to communicate to distributions, but the fact that those responsible failed to do that, doesn't give everybody else a free pass.
>publicly sharing the exploit was irresponsible
they did it in the established industry standard way that probably every single security researcher you can think of follows (for good reason, i would add).
whoever did the marketing on "responsible disclosure" was a genius.
tptacek says it much better than me: ""Responsible disclosure" is an Orwellian term cooked up between @Stake and Microsoft and other large vendors to coerce researchers into synchronizing with vendor release schedules."
so what? we should never disclose anything? this will only result in companies suppressing disclosure and leaving vulnerabilities unpatched.
No, this was already timed disclosure. This is very common and widely accepted. 90+30 is what Google Project Zero uses, for example. The security researcher has met their ethical requirements already. This is entirely on the kernel's security team for failure to communicate downstream. That is their responsibility.
The thing is, malicous actors are already monitoring most major projects and doing either source analysis or binary analysis to figure out if changes were made to patch a vulnerability. So, as soon as you actually patch, you really need to disclose because all you're doing by not disclosing the vulnerability is handing the bad actors a free go. The black hats already know. You need to tell the white hats, too, so they can patch.