logoalt Hacker News

A1kmmyesterday at 10:29 PM2 repliesview on HN

The article doesn't really explain well how this is spying.

So companies A & B (A=TSMC, B=Tokyo Electron) are in a customer-supplier relationship. Employee B1 of B asks Employees A1 & A2 of A ask for information about how B's technology is working in practice at A, which involves revealing information about A's processes. A1 & A2 supply the information, and B2 at B uses it to improve how B does things, so they can help A more and increase their business with A. There is no allegation that the information supplied to B by A employees left B, or was used for anything except to help with the collaboration between B & A. And as far as the article mentions, no evidence A1 or A2 received a bribe or anything like that.

And yet manager A3 at A finds out about this supply and freaks out because they didn't want A1 & A2 sharing that much information with the supplier. So they make a complaint - and A1, A2, B1, B2 and B as a company all face significant penalties.

This seems unjust given A1, A2, B1 & B2 were all just trying to collaborate in the best interests of their companies, and B employees only used things freely and non-corruptly given to them by A employees; no information was leaked outside of the collaborating companies. A1 & A2 might have broken their company policies, but this probably should have ended at them being educated on the company policies and being asked not to do it again when managing future supplier relationships.


Replies

shaknayesterday at 10:38 PM

The way you spelled that out, is a specific story that almost all clearance holders in all countries are taught specifically means corruption.

Its not unjust - its exactly what you are taught not to do, with government contracts! Its not just breaking company policy, its illegal in most countries.

alephnerdyesterday at 10:38 PM

> This seems unjust given A1, A2, B1 & B2 were all just trying to collaborate in the best interests of their companies

Not really. This is the norms for industrial espionage, especially as Tokyo Electron is also working on the Rapidus 2nm fab project in Japan.

Furthermore, for these kinds of relationships there tend to be significant internal firewalls which were clearly overriden within TSMC.

And speaking from personal experience back in my individual contributor days in the security space, this attack path was a fairly common one for data and IP exfiltration.

> There is no allegation that the information supplied to B by A employees left B, or was used for anything except to help with the collaboration between B & A

From TFA - "The information, including trade secrets related to etching equipment used in 2-nanometer production, was photographed and reproduced to allow Tokyo Electron to evaluate and improve its equipment performance".

This was done without permission and done so by a vendor actively working on building a direct competitor to TSMC.