That's really not good. Fortunately I'm not using any short-lived certificates like the recently announced 6 day certs, so have some breathing room. Without further details, I'd imagine anyone with a short-lived cert is getting a bit sweaty right now.
Let's Encrypt has become one of those pieces of critical Internet infrastructure that just quietly hums away in the background, the fact that they've stopped ALL issuance is deeply concerning.
Considering the open source nature of Letsencrypt, I wonder what the barriers/costs would be (theoretically) to a wealthy benefactor who wanted to duplicate its server side infrastructure and a core staffing level of persons, and fund a "parallel" equally trusted, alternative entity with a solid governing board. Same general idea how Acton funded the Signal foundation.
Somewhere that none of the physical infrastructure/hosting environment overlapped with existing Letsencrypt stuff so that the failure of one entity would have zero blast radius affecting the other.
I know there's a long and complicated process to go through to become a trusted root CA and get your CA public cert auto-installed in every OS and browser trust store. Indeed in the early days of letsencrypt I recall their root CA certs were signed by other older root CAs.
I just find it incredible that in 30+ years the industry hasn't adapted one bit to the brittle failure modes of certificates. I did some subcontract work with Verisign to deploy their CA infrastructure back in the early oughties and it felt like a solution was overdue way back then. I was at Google in the teensies when gmail broke due to expired SMTP certs. WAAAY overdue by then. Here we are, a decade later and it's still the same lol.
>pieces of critical Internet infrastructure that just quietly hums away in the background,
And donation supported no less
Wonder what incident that even could have been.
> like the recently announced 6 day certs
Just you wait for the 1 hour and 59 minutes certs! For security!
Stopping all issuance is an pretty standard response if a CA thinks what they are issuing might be non-compliant in any way. It's an action we're required to take. It's not necessarily a sign of a more dramatic failure mode or key compromise. That said, the impact is the same for as long as the downtime lasts so it is unfortunate and we're sorry for the disruption.
I don't think the premise behind short lived (six day) certificates being viable is that CA issuance never goes down. Sure, the runway is shorter, but not that short. Most down time is a few hours or less, which is not a problem for six day certificates that should be renewed every three days.
Short lived certificates are optional though, so if it's not worth it to you there are longer lifetime options.