> that's because you have a service principle in your IAM trust relationship that allowed us access
That’s why it’s so complicated!!!
I don’t understand how I should evaluate trust for your internal EBS org versus your internal ALB org.
I kinda just expect it to be all “AWS” trust.
And it’s all garbage anyway. There’s no way I can prevent the hypothetically untrustworthy EBS team from surreptitiously adding charges to my account if they want to. Right? This would maybe make some sense if I could top level turn off/on services, but that isn’t how it works.
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I have no doubt this makes some sense from someone inside the machine, but from the outside it’s not helpful nor useful.
>I kinda just expect it to be all “AWS” trust.
This would be very unwise from security standpoint. Internal access to customer stuff is granular and made hard for internal staff to gain, to minimize chances of screw up intentional or not.
3 things to untangle here.
1. It's about trust and auditability, while you may not want or need it, there are a lot of customer that are either interested or legally obligated to know who have accessed certain data.
2. It's about dogfooding - how would you trust an identity and access system when the company does not even use it internally?
3. In general, there are quick buttons and template to do it if you don't want to worry about it, in the LLM age, this gets easier. Personally I prefer this because I intensely dislike "magic". This allow you to control, to the maximum degree possible, what is actually going on, despite not owning any of the physical aspect of the data center.