I think my message wooshed. I was not comparing disk encryption and iCloud backups. My point is that insecure defaults are Apple and other's alternative to backdoors. They give plausible deniability ("how is someone able to recover their data if they lost their credentials and we used E2E?"), while at the same time satisfying law enforcement, because the vast majority of people is not aware of them.

Another example is WhatsApp on Android, by default when backups are enabled, they are stored unencrypted in Google Drive. A good counter-example is Signal, which opts out of backups on iOS and Android and the only option is to do E2E backups to their own servers.

I'm also fairly confidant in Apple's full disk encryption, they've gone to court to defend it.

FWIW, in the last leaked report, iPhone was not an issue AFU for Cellebrite (macOS is most likely even easier due to looser security):

https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/14344-cellebrite-premium-ju...