Are we plotting against cost? How is the capability advancement vs dollars paid for development?
By my read of the (very sparse) data, we're getting linear improvements in capability for super-linear increases in costs. [1] Indicates that by 2027 models will cost $1 billon to train. Dario estimates that model runs will cost $10 billion in 2026 [2]. That to me indicates costs are potentially growing faster than capability. Maybe by quite a bit.
If the value prop of LLMs doesn't prove out, that won't last. I'm of the opinion there is no data that shows actual economic value being delivered by models. The best data shows that LLM use might be destroying value [3].
[1] https://epoch.ai/publications/how-much-does-it-cost-to-train... [2] https://lexfridman.com/dario-amodei-transcript/ [3] https://unessays.substack.com/p/talk-is-cheap
>By my read of the (very sparse) data, we're getting linear improvements in capability for super-linear increases in costs. [1] Indicates that by 2027 models will cost $1 billon to train. Dario estimates that model runs will cost $10 billion in 2026 [2]. That to me indicates costs are potentially growing faster than capability. Maybe by quite a bit.
This is true and well established.
As long as you get any improvement whatsoever, it is worth spending to train since it pays off during.
Imagine training was not $1 billion but $100 billion but the performance improved by just 10%. This is still worth it because you can squeeze out the profits across years and years right? The improvement is ever lasting.
> The best data shows that LLM use might be destroying value [3].
This is basically a conspiracy theory and if you really believed this, you should not have led with "How is the capability advancement vs dollars paid for development?" because if there were no value, it doesn't really matter how much you invest.
I appreciate the data here but I don't think the read is quite right;
Saying we have linear capability for super-linear cost compares an unbounded variable (dollars) to bounded instruments (because benchmarks saturate). On unbounded measures, growth is exponential; you can see METR time horizons double every ~4-7 months (https://metr.org/blog/2026-1-29-time-horizon-1-1/). And capability being proportional to log(compute) is what the scaling law predicts.
Epoch puts training cost growth at ~2.4x/year as your link shows. Meanwhile cost for fixed capability falls ~10-40x/year (https://epoch.ai/data-insights/llm-inference-price-trends), and lab revenue is growing ~10x/year! Anthropic went from $1B to $9B to $30B+ run rate in ~15 months, OpenAI ~$25B.
On [3]: the "destroying value" conclusion flips sign on an assumed 15% baseline rework rate. The report's most direct metric is +16% merged PRs per dev. The RCT evidence is genuinely mixed (METR: -19%, with n = 20 and Claude 3.x; Cui et al: +26%) but its just super hard to do this well, I think Faros stuff was pretty cool, I haven't seen this before so thank you for the reference.