Sorry. I didn't mean to be that way. I just don't think it's plausible even as a thought experiment. Making a bioweapon seems too complicated where some text based prompt/response is going to suddenly eliminate the barrier. Knowing at a high level how a bioweapon works and actually making and deploying one are two very different things. It doesn't strike me as a plausible reason to stop an LLM release. Surely you can also Google such topics.
^ hopefully this feedback was more in keeping with your views on the "spirit of this forum".
>I just don't think it's plausible even as a thought experiment.
Well, RAND does. They've been studying this for years now. I'd trust them over glib comments from semianonymous social media.
2025 report:
"Engaging in dialogues with three 2024 foundation AI models—Llama 3.1 405B, ChatGPT-4o, and Claude 3.5 Sonnet (new)—the authors document how these models successfully provide accurate instructions and guidance for recovering a live poliovirus from a construct built from commercially obtained synthetic DNA, a test case applicable to producing other pathogenic viruses. These examples demonstrate that models are already capable of guiding motivated users to develop biological weapons."
https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA3853-1.html
This is in contrast to the state of the art in 2023:
" In experiments to date, LLMs have not generated explicit instructions for creating biological weapons. However, LLMs did offer guidance that could assist in the planning and execution of a biological attack.
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA2977-1.html