logoalt Hacker News

Terr_today at 2:34 AM1 replyview on HN

I want to raise the possibility that you (pixl97, simoncion) actually hold many of the same opinions but are clashing because of a different definitions the LLM / bad-thingy scope.

* Narrowly - The core algorithm that extends documents cannot be made safe, because it's a stochastic machine with no data/instruction separation possible. Unanticipated input can evoke arbitrary output.

* Broadly - The overall offering (centered on the document-extender algorithm) could be made safe by limiting its over-ambitious scope, treating the document-extender output as malicious-by-default, and sharply limiting what that output can drive or influence. Of course, that would exclude the berjillion-dollar stock valuation replace-all-humans stuff.


Replies

simonciontoday at 2:44 AM

> ...but are using different boundaries for what constitutes "the LLM"

I'll make note that my original comment only used the term "LLM" in the phrases "the LLM companies" and "LLM-based systems". The latter use was in this footnote:

  One might argue that the fundamental nature of LLM-based systems makes this impossible. *If* that were true, then it would mean that these systems are *impossible* to make safe... the *only* safety option available would be to establish comprehensive blacklists, which is simply infeasible.
I acknowledge that my follow-on commentary -the one to which you replied- got sloppy with the terminology. I should have used the phrase "LLM-based systems", rather than "LLMs". I do feel that my original commentary was not at all sloppy with the terminology and made my position on the current state of the safety of the systems sold by the Big LLM Vendors and general understanding of where the bounds of the big pile of linear algebra and the bounds of the I/O to and from that pile lie clear.