alt Hacker NewsI do not believe that chosen plaintext attacks are obsolete. Any time you have an encrypting oracle setup in which the scheme itself does not require some sort of modification of the plaintext itself, you can reach for a chosen plaintext attack. I believe mitigations are known and can be applied or required in standards, but I don't think it's a 'dead' area of cryptanalytic research -- there's so much devil in the details of implementations around the world for these schemes that it seems almost impossible to imagine.
Chosen plaintext attacks can work against things like hashing algorithms.
But with methods of encryption like AES GCM or any other based on the counter mode, an encrypting oracle does not encrypt the text provided by the adversary.
It encrypts a sequence of numbers that cannot be influenced in any way by the adversary, which is then used as an encryption mask for the text chosen by the adversary.
No matter what text is chosen by the adversary, it cannot obtain any other information from the oracle except which was the encryption mask.
Therefore, the chosen plaintext attack is converted into a much weaker known plaintext attack, because in the worst case the adversary knows both the initial counter value, i.e. the sequence of numbers, and the encryption mask generated by encrypting that sequence.
Only if AES were used in a hashing algorithm, instead of being used for encryption, while using a dedicated hash function for hashing, then AES would be exposed to a chosen plaintext attack, when the adversary would be able to provide the text to be hashed and the oracle would give the hash value.
IF AES were used in obsolete modes of operation for encryption, like AES-CBC, then it would be exposed to chosen plaintext attacks.