alt Hacker News> Having a digital ID does not obviate that (in principle), thanks to zero-knowledge schemes.
Yes it does, because zero-knowledge schemes take it as an assumption that all of the people who are supposed to have credentials can be trusted not to share them with people who aren't, since you're proposing a system that provides no means for that to be detected. And this context doesn't allow that assumption.
With a normal ID, the entity required to demand ID compares the picture on the ID to the person using it, which obviously doesn't work when they're not being provided with any identifying information. You thereby have no way to know that the ID belongs to the user and anyone can allow anyone else to use their ID, thereby defeating the system.
Which means that the proponents would never be satisfied with the result and the only thing building that system does is entrench something with the shape of a non-consensual identification system, which will then have any ZK features disabled (assuming they were actually implemented to begin with) when the consequences prove unsatisfactory.
> Yes it does, because zero-knowledge schemes take it as an assumption that all of the people who are supposed to have credentials can be trusted not to share them with people who aren't
No, ZK schemes have absolutely nothing to do with sybil resistance. That's a threat modeling concern anyways.
If your point is that the entire digital ID plan is nascent because it remains vulnerable to sybil attacks, that it may very well be, and so indeed there would need to be extra-technological measures to ensure the 1:1 mapping. That is no longer a cryptographic or technological concern however, but a governance and incentivization one.
It also means that it can't "kill the internet" then though, doesn't it?
> which obviously doesn't work when they're not being provided with any identifying information. You thereby have no way to know that the ID belongs to the user and anyone can allow anyone else to use their ID, thereby defeating the system
This is about digital identification. The facts you list off are beyond the analog hole. What you describe is (or at least should be) a non-goal for any scheme in this context, because it is fundamentally unsolveable.
> Which means that the proponents would never be satisfied with the result and the only thing building that system does is entrench something with the shape of a non-consensual identification system
This is (loaded) political speculation, not an argument.