Making definitive claims about whether LLMs do or do not have specific properties absolutely does require precise definitions of those properties that can be used to evaluate those questions. Merely hand waving that LLMs didn't undergo the same evolutionary process is not a definitive argument.
For example, the Turing machines and the lambda calculus don't look anything alike, but they are fundamentally interconvertible, and so in a real sense they are fundamentally equivalent. Without a model, all of your arguments are completely unconvincing for exactly the same reasons, eg. that there may exist many paths to fundamentally equivalent ends.
I just don't think linguistic (or other symbolic) representations alone can contain the information, in any sense of the word, of what e.g. human subjective experiences actually are like. The concepts we express with language get their meaning from our physical reality, even if quite indirectly in case of some abstract concepts.
Hunger as a concept doesn't mean anything without the physical need. Politeness or bluntness, even in writing, don't mean anything without social dynamics. And we have social dynamics (and neural structures that directly process social cues and associated feelings) because we've evolved into social animals for whose survival that was important.
I see no reason to believe that a model trained only with symbolic representations, with no connection to the physical world phenomena that those symbols represent, could contain the subjective experience itself.
Neural network models may be able to derive novel (or at least novel-looking) output rather than just an obvious rehash of their input, but I don't think any set of bytes can fundamentally contain information that was never entered into it. (Even if e.g. a model produces previously unknown mathematical results, those results can in principle be derived from the information that they were trained with.)
I'm not saying that artificial neural networks couldn't, in principle, be aware. ANNs and biological neural nets may be equivalent in the sense that any information and processing structures represented by a biological one could in principle be represented by an artificial one. If that's the case, and awareness is purely a product of our neural systems as materialism would imply, it should be possible for an ANN to be aware, too.
But when the model has been trained with only language, and IMO the subjective experience can't be derived from the symbolic representation alone, I can't see how the model could include the actual subjective human experience.
An AI model could of course have an awareness and subjective experiences that are totally different than our human experience. But then the fact that it happens to produce output resembling what humans find meaningful shouldn't be considered indicative of such awareness.
This is of course more of a philosophical argument than a technical one, and I'm happy to hear counterarguments, but not on the level of off-hand dismissal.