> The project’s position is that hardware binding remains required

I think you're downplaying the real risk: if TPM becomes necessary for any single routine activity (banking, communication, etc.) then the usability of any non-TPM hardware to access the internet approaches zero. What's the point of a Linux desktop that asks for attestation for every HTTP request? Or an Android phone that can't legally allow you to install APKs from beyond the Play Store?

I can't pay for things with NFC on my GrapheneOS phone because my bank doesn't trust the hardware. While this is a slight annoyance, it doesn't meaningfully affect my ability to use cards or type in numbers or authenticate with a fingerprint on my phone; however, the forced use of TPM to access anything should be rejected and protested at every step.

Encryption can never be stamped out, thankfully, but hardware is not within one's control: you get what is allowed to be sold.