> cannot be exfiltrated by userspace or installed kernel space apps or intercepted on the way to TPM
So it must be secure against the user, as expected.
Preventing the user from "tampering" with the token means carving out a section of the machine and putting it out of his reach. You just created a government embassy on the user's machine. There's no telling what it will be abused for, and there's no escape.
> But sure, it's a all an evil conspiracy against general purpose computing.
You just advocated for putting an inescapable persisent cryptographic government ID on everybody's computers. This is the literal implementation of the surveillance state. Everything you do online, this token gets sent. It's the end of anonymity. Not even Tor gets around this.
Yes, that's what a TPM or smart card chip in your ID/Passport does.
Prevents tampering even by the "user".
I have advocated nothing of the sort you're accusing me of. Please leave your strawman at home.
Having a physical card fallback here is a necessity and nothing in these proposals shows that the physical card ID is going away.