Keyv and friends compromised in active Shai-Hulud supply chain attack

At this point, any package adding a pre-install hook where there previously was not one should be denied and treated with extreme suspicion.

It's time pre-install / post-install hooks were killed off. Start with a moratorium on any new ones.

Oh boy, it's a big one.

Does anyone happen to have a grep or similar that helps me check if this is showing up anywhere in the trillions of files in node_modules (or pnpm store)?

I think npm can use chatgpt/claude for each published package to detect these types of attack? And if it sees they can restrict the package from making any changes.

aikido.dev: SAST, AI code analysis and therefore a website that uses 100% CPU and prevents scrolling.

To the point of the article: I don't know why GitHub still allows the release feature. It is complete insanity. Tar archives must be constructed manually and checked for leaked keys etc.

I am kind of surprised GitHub doesn't seem to have built a simple classifier for public repos to proactively lock the account of anyone uploading such obviously fishy things (for their own good, at least before the repo is publicly findable), so it can't be used as a rendezvous.

Surely Github's software is good enough that an intern can slop the 80/20 together in a day? It would be an actually good use of AI spending.

> Update — August 4, 2026, 13:37 CEST: At least 868 packages (across 1381 versions) have been compromised by the worm, with a combined total of over 2 billion monthly installs at the time of writing.

This is such lazy or click baiting writing. Who cares how many installations there are per month normally? The high install numbers are almost certainly from running in CI where such secrets don’t exist. How many installs actually occur in a non CI environment and of those how many were the compromised version?