This seems like exactly the kind of attempt to blame a single person rather than the system that the article is arguing against. Yes, the helicopter pilot was a major part of the series of mistakes that led to the crash, but there were many other points where, if someone had done something differently, the crash may never have happened. This includes:
- the instructor who let the helicopter pilot keep flying through dangerous airspace despite her being clearly disoriented, and who ALSO failed to appropriately consider or respond to ATC’s request for visual separation
- the FAA employee who refused the helicopter chart updates to make dangerous areas clearer
- the ATC who failed to respond appropriately to the alarm by giving the helicopter a specific instruction - the supervisor who failed to separate the local and helicopter duties when the level of traffic was high
And that’s just specific individuals, to say nothing of the military bureaucracy that kept aging fleets with poor equipment operating in close proximity to heavy commercial traffic, or the idiocy of the FAA reclassifying reagan as an airport where controllers get paid less despite a heavy workload and thus increasing the incentive for controllers to leave as soon as they could, preventing any building of institutional knowledge.
Assigning all the blame to one individual, no matter how critical their role in the accident, robs us of opportunities to make the system safer. That is always the point of Admiral Cloudberg’s articles, but especially this one.
I would say all of those things are indicative of the mentality that we're criticizing here.
"If something isn't right, someone has to do something."
The joke in aviation is that "the first two strikes are free." In baseball terms, you get one free screwup per flight, and it'll probably be fine. The second strike... you are pushing your luck. On the third strike you're out.
In this case the pilot continuing to fly while not performing well, ranking officer or not, was strike one.
The more proficient pilot not taking the aircraft away from her was strike two.
The controller not offering more clear instructions and the helicopter crew not demanding more clear instructions despite noticing that the airport was very busy was strike three.
Just because the helicopter crew screwed up does not mean that all of those admin types on the ground didn't also make their own three strikes worth of mistakes.