It's not even a "backdoor", it's documented in the datasheet...
http://datasheets.chipdb.org/VIA/Nehemiah/VIA%20C3%20Nehemia... (page 82)
...which along with the already publicly-known microarchitecture of the C3 makes this statement sound like total nonsense:
The rosenbridge backdoor is a small, non-x86 core embedded alongside the main x86 core in the CPU
I remember laughing at this with a few others knowledgeable in x86 when it first came out; a self-proclaimed "security researcher" who somehow failed to RTFM.
There's even a Wikipedia article about it now, with a link to the alternate instruction set documentation: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alternate_Instruction_Set
"It's documented in the datasheet" is such a weak excuse for a backdoor.
Documenting a backdoor doesn't make it not a backdoor, just means it's not a hidden backdoor.
The fact that a number of machines shipped with the backdoor accidentally enabled, and nobody noticed for over a decade shows just how dangerous even a documented backdoor can be. The oversight wasn't even detected by someone reading the manual, it was detected by a security researcher who wrote a generic tool to fuzz out such backdoors.
It's not as clear cut as you describe it here. In the other old thread you linked there was no real consensus if this should be considered a backdoor or not.
Was this documentation public at the time? The pdf still does not document the instructions themselves.