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leecommamichaeltoday at 4:31 PM1 replyview on HN

Has Go not had the most secure ecosystem?

What is your critique of their approach? Is it not the case that `go get` is the only one which doesn't even provide a way for the person downloading to run the downloaded code until it is actually executed by the consuming codebase? That seems pretty sound by comparison.

I guess you're saying, "they had to" meaning they should've seen the need and provided it? I'll say this to that (imagined) take; plenty of useful software was made without it, and they got the job done when they knew the absolute most about what a good solution would need. I totally understand being annoyed at the fact that this is the story of every evolution in Go, but I genuinely think they're picking good implementations when they decide on them.


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hnlmorgtoday at 4:43 PM

> What is your critique of their approach?

It’s half arsed, brittle and far from user friendly.

> Is it not the case that `go get` is the only one which doesn't even provide a way for the person downloading to run the downloaded code until it is actually executed by the consuming codebase?

If you’ve added the package to your imported then odds are your next step is going to build it. Thus negating any benefit.

I think the real issue is malicious packages entering package ecosystems. Whether your package manage executes on downloads or not is moot because you’ve still got untrusted code sat in your project imports, just waiting to be accidentally executed.

> I guess you're saying, "they had to" meaning they should've seen the need and provided it? I'll say this to that (imagined) take; plenty of useful software was made without it, and they got the job done when they knew the absolute most about what a good solution would need. I totally understand being annoyed at the fact that this is the story of every evolution in Go.

I think you’re being too charitable here. I think Russ Cox just didn’t want a package manager because C doesn’t have one. But ended up relenting after everyone nagged the Go team for years afterwards.

And really what they built was the bare minimum to manage package version pinning and updates. But it has none of the visibility that central package repositories have. So how do you know if a Go package has been compromised when the only source of truth is the compromised origin?

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