> You cannot look at an air catastrophe and retrospectively say "failures X, Y, and Z were observed, therefore if we correct failures X, Y, and Z, we would have been okay."

That's literally exactly what air safety researchers do in an air disaster. There is a famous saying along the lines of "Air travel regulations are written in blood", meaning that all the regulations we have now are a result of fixing issues that led to previous disasters piece-by-piece.

> The takeaway is "failures X, Y, and Z were observed, which necessarily happened in an environment of failures X_0 through Z_10x10^10, and so therefore patching X, Y, and Z would be insufficient to address overall risks of the system."

Yes, I 100% agree with this. But I think that's what the author of the article was saying as well:

> That report had one key new piece of information, and some good prosaic steps OpenAI will be taking to strengthen its alignment, training, supervision, infrastructure and incident response.

> Mostly it confirmed what we already knew. The questions we most wanted answers to, that we did not already know, were mostly not answered. There was a distinct lack of self-reflection, especially about decision making and safety culture, and about the approach to alignment. I came away disappointed.

I.e. the "prosaic steps" are just the "fix X/Y/Z" as you point out. But what is needed is a more fundamental rethinking around stuff like safety culture, monitoring, and even things like better research into how agents do decision making in the first place.