> WhatsApp is end-to-end encrypted,
- Meta data of your messages is not encrypted so meta can make a graph of who you talk to and when
- backups are not encrypted by default so plaintext of your private chats can be obtained
- even if you enable encryption for backups all it takes is for the other person in your private convo (or a person in a group chat) to not enable it for your messages to be available in plaintext
> - backups are not encrypted by default so plaintext of your private chats can be obtained
Yes, but importantly not by Meta themselves.
> - Meta data of your messages is not encrypted so meta can make a graph of who you talk to and when
Fair enough and worth mentioning. I'm personally fine with it.
> - even if you enable encryption for backups all it takes is for the other person in your private convo (or a person in a group chat) to not enable it for your messages to be available in plaintext
Yes, but how would you prevent that even in principle? I can't control what the people I'm messaging do with their copy of my messages. As long as there isn't unnecessary non-repudiation (e.g. by the sender cryptographically signing all outbound messages, which the Signal protocol intentionally avoids), I think this is fair as well.
I do agree that e.g. vanishing chats with a short timeout/"view only once" images should probably not be included in backups, though; last time I checked, I think they were.
WhatsApp / Meta is also on both sides of the E2EE.
I've read that if you give FB/IG/WA access to all files/photos, and you have GPS metadata for photos (I do, hey it's useful to know where I took a pic), it can trawl that data to see where you've been and when...
So now Android strips location info when sharing an image to an app. A filter layer between filesystem and app, to add complexity to the whole system...