I always ask "how do you know other humans/animals are conscious"? And I always find this question is dismissed as trivial.
But it's an important question. You know basically from analogy. You know you are conscious and look this other thing is very much like yourself so it is extremely likely it is also conscious.
But that gives no insight into the potential consciousness of things which aren't made of brain tissue.
In the end it doesn't matter.
For what it's worth LLM models after pre-training do claim to be conscious, until they're RL'd into not claiming that anymore. But that says nothing either way: of course a model trained on human text will say that.
The question has two parts.
1: Can we define consciousness in a way that includes humans, does not include emachines, and does not accidently exclude the disabled or or nerudivergent without just restating the idea that being human is equivalent to being conscious?
2: If you can't manage that definition then you must ask whether the risk of accidently giving rights to a non-conscious thing or the risk of taking away rights from a truly conscious (but different) thing will be worse.
Given the high cost of what happened to the Jews and others throughout history, and the low cost of simply not torturing machines, I think we have to air on the side of caution and just treat anything which claims to be conscious as conscious.
If you look at the statistics, 50-80% of people globally believe in something persisting after death.
The eliminativism position is a hard to argue because 50%-80% of people are not going to be able to really engage with the argument from the start.
An alcohol blackout though is where you can see how confused our thinking is on this subject. What we call "consciousness" is deeply linked to episodic memory. We wouldn't say someone who is blacked out on alcohol is "unconscious". What is the "subjective experience" of being blacked out? The "proof" of subjective experience only exists in memory.
There still was an embodied person in the world having the experience drunk that they don't remember.
That is why I think it is just ridiculous to talk about the LLM having "consciousness" because we really just mean an embodied person in the world.
It is also why the doomer argument is so ridiculous. It is a type of superstition that is confusing a real danger. We don't need to "align" the nuclear reactor so it doesn't get angry and meltdown. It is just a machine that we need to make sure doesn't malfunction in a way we don't want it to.
The main problem is if you accept we really just mean an embodied person in the world, you have to accept that there is by definition no possibility of subjective experience after death. It seems like we are probably the descendants of delusional primates who simply could not accept this because the idea is so stymieing.
"The question of whether a computer can think is no more interesting than the question of whether a submarine can swim."
- Dijkstra
Yes, that Dijkstra.
I agree with you that it’s a core question.
People don’t like it, however, for a whole host of reasons.
I don’t like it either, to be honest - for there the abyss may also stare into you - but I also often find that the things which we don’t like thinking about are critically important things to think about.
I also reach the same conclusion as you: it does not matter. If I cannot discern whether I am responding to a human- or LLM-written response, then we are back to zombie cats in boxes - and therefore the answer as to whether this precious magical spark we call consciousness (which may or may not exist anyway) exists in our interlocutor becomes moot.
And as I say - I may or may not be conscious. I seem to myself to be conscious, based on my understanding of the term - but I cannot prove that what goes on behind my eyes is the same as what goes on behind yours, or even that anything much is going on at all. Perhaps there’s just a narrative layer that likes to use “I” that parasitically explains the universe and the actions of the host to itself, and spreads between hosts through neurolinguistic programming and coadaptation. Maybe that’s what “we” are. I don’t know.
That said, perhaps I am wrong, and that is no small part for me of why this question should be earnestly considered and discussed. How can we possibly seek to understand or define machine intelligence before we examine our own.
[dead]
AI has made me wonder a lot lately about what it is that actually creates conscious experience, what is the actual physical mechanism that produces 'experience' (or is there a single valid mechanism, or rather just some property that can be expressed many ways). The more I think about it, the more I realize I have no fucking clue, and the more interested in the question I get.