alt Hacker NewsHi OP, funny enough I’m working on something very similar. Lots of us are I guess! Take that as validation of your thinking.
I like that your readme has a couple paragraphs comparing to popular tools in this space. Personally I feel it is a bit light on the security differentiators (if any). For example you are using the same fundamental primitives that are used in nsjail, runc, etc. Thus it seems you have recreated those libraries in some aspects, so would be curious to hear your rationale for approaching this way vs building explicitly on those primitives.
Thanks! My initial approach and the first prototype was for Drop to be a Python script that generates config.json file for runc Docker runtime (I also tried crun). I ran into issues that prevented the sandbox from being set up with all the Drop-required properties. These issues were certainly technically fixable, but it could be difficult for a new project with no usage to advocate for features in mature and widely adopted tools. Especially that runc and crun are OCI-compatible Container Runtimes, and Drop is not an OCI-compatible container, so it could be justifiably out of scope for these projects not to support Drop usage.
Anyway, my decision, for which I also evaluated the use of bubblewrap as a building block, was to err on the side of flexibility that calling fine-grained Linux APIs directly give. For a project like Drop, runc could be seen as very coarse-grained JSON-based API to Linux sandboxing calls (basically a single call: setup a sandbox, here is a json config that describes it), similarly bubblewrap is a coarse grained command-line API to Linux sandboxing calls. Reusing such tried and proved layers of course also has significant advantages, so as in case of many engineering decision, it wasn't super obvious which path is better.
Drop eventually integrated gVisor's runsc (as an option), which is also OCI-compatible Container Runtime, but this is to add a user-space kernel isolation layer.